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Abstract
Industry wage differentials may result either from the structure of the industry
(demand type) or human capital (supply type) characteristics of the employed labour
force. This study uses two major data sets from Germany and the US that allow
the investigation of the effects of these demand and supply type factors on average
earnings across industries. The main contribution of the paper shows that aggre-
gate demand relevant to the particular industry has a strong positive effect on the
industry’s average earnings in addition to the previously established results regard-
ing the significance of the effects of worker and firm characteristics. Consequently,
labour market policies, which address solely the characteristics of the workforce and
their human capital without due consideration of the macroeconomic environment
and the structure of the industry, should be expected to produce the disappointing
results of an increasing share of low pay employment in the wage distribution.
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1 Introduction
Classical and neo-classical labour market theory assumes that pay is largely determined
by how productive the individual worker is and how effective market incentives are in
mobilising his or her productive effort. Thus, the inference would be that earnings differ-
ences mainly reflect individuals’ relative worth and hence low earnings are symptomatic
of low levels of ability and skill. Consequently, the only important determinant of an
individual’s position on the earnings ladder would be the human capital he or she brings
to the labour market and his or her inherent productivity. Mincer (1974) argued that
“the model of worker self-investment as the basic determinant of earnings might be crit-
icised as giving undue weight to the supply of human capital while ignoring the demand
side of the market. Certainly demand conditions in general, and employer investments
in human capital of workers in particular, affect wage rates and time spent in employ-
ment, and thereby affect earnings. The present approach is initial and simple and greater
methodological sophistication is clearly desirable” (page 137). Yet, the theoretical and
empirical investigations of the classical tradition have largely ignored the effects of de-
mand factors on the determination of earnings that would need to be taken into account
in assessing the policy repercussions of the human capital model.
In contrast to the human capital model predictions of the labour market, the job
competition model (Thurow, 1957) is based on the proposition that there is a queue
of workers competing for jobs, with those at the head of the queue being hired first.
Education determines the likelihood of getting a job, but only a particular level of
education required for that job is directly rewarded in terms of pay. A more encompassing
framework is captured by the assignment model (Tinbergen, 1956; Sattinger, 1993) which
incorporates both supply and demand features of the labour market, by suggesting there
is an allocation problem of assigning workers with various attributes to a range of jobs
with differing levels of complexity. Precisely where workers are located will determine
the pay that they are likely to receive.
Furthermore, alternative approaches to labour market analysis suggest that rela-
tionships in the labour market are determined by industry structures, inequalities in
bargaining power and deficient labour demand, and this can lead to the systematic un-
derpayment of certain labour groups. The basic proposition is that the individual’s
position on the earnings ladder derives from the characteristics of the employing estab-
lishment rather than the worker. This approach focuses on the structure of the labour
market and their impact on capabilities and return to human capital of individuals
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(Bluestone, 1970; Wachtel and Betsey, 1972; Ryan, 1990).
Evidence suggests that low paid workers are not spread evenly throughout all indus-
tries, even if they operate in similar product markets. They are usually concentrated
in industries that have failed, for some reason or other, to provide a level of wage to
their employees comparable to similar workers employed in similar industries. Isolating
these reasons can provide some insight into the underlying mechanisms responsible for
generating the increased incidence of low paid employment in some industries.
Thus, the focus of this study is the average earner in an industry and the forces
affecting his or her earnings. It attempts to evaluate the effect of the industry’s char-
acteristics on the average pay and, then, to evaluate the relative importance of those
characteristics on the variation of industry average earnings versus the average human
capital characteristics and the level of macroeconomic demand relevant to the particular
industry.
In view of the above, this paper examines the average earnings across industries in two
advanced industrialised countries for which suitable data is available. Thus, for the US 16
industries and 51 states, and for Germany 63 industries and sixteen Bundesland regions,
are investigated, over the period 1990-2013. The variable to be explained is always the
average level of industry earnings by year and region or state. The explanatory variables
include the average mix of human capital characteristics of employees in the industry, the
structural characteristics of the industry namely (average firm size, level of unionisation)
and the level of macroeconomic demand relevant to the particular industry.
The remainder of the paper henceforth is set out as follows. In the next section an
overview of the pertinent literature on the industrial wage structure is presented. Section
3 describes the data in the study, while section 4 discusses the methodologies employed.
The results are discussed in section 5 and conclusions and policy implications are offered
in section 6.
2 Overview of the literature
Human capital theory suggests that an individual’s human capital endowment is the sole
mechanism for someone getting and maintaining a well-paid job. Early work by Becker
(1962, 1964); Mincer (1974); Ben-Porath (1967) describes the contributions of experience
and education to the earnings potential of individuals. A large literature estimating wage
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equations evaluates this theory (Heckman et al., 2003). Although no-one could deny that
skill supply via education, work experience and other human capital investments affects
where workers fall in the earnings distribution, this study focuses on the contribution of
industry characteristics and structural demand factors on the determination of earnings
levels.
Competitive conditions in the labour market should ensure that labour is paid a
wage which reflects its net productivity, where this has been adjusted for differences in
working conditions. Earlier studies reveal that industry-specific variables play no part
in competitive explanations of earnings differences (Pugel, 1980). However, later studies
revealed that industry effects account for between 7 to 30 per cent of the variation of
non-union wage rates and 10 to 29 per cent of the variation of union wage rates in
1983 (Dickens and Katz, 1987). There are several reasons offered in the literature as
an explanation for some industries to pay more than others. Amiti and Davis (2012)
show that a fall in output tariffs lowers wages in import-competing firms but increases
the wages paid by exporting firms using Indonesian data. Tariffs have also been shown
to cause wage premiums in certain industries in Columbia by creating rents (Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2005b). Other industries may be characterised by employment contracts
designed to circumvent regulation on pay and benefits. Brown and Sessions (2003) show
that, in the UK, the increased use of fixed term contracts tends to reduce wages, and
that this cannot be attributed to those on fixed term contracts having lower levels of
education.
Krueger and Summers (1988) point to firm characteristics as an important source
of wage differences across industries. Hence, average firm characteristics should be ex-
pected to affect industry average pay. The above authors’ conclusions are based on their
findings that differences in earnings differentials persist, conditional on worker fixed-
effects, and within occupations. Using matched employer-employee data, Abowd et al.
(2012) confirm1 that high paying employers may exist if a desire for equity, within firms
with many high-skill jobs, drives up the wages of other workers (Thaler, 1989). Further-
more, in the UK, Metcalf (1999) points out that “the incidence of low pay is far higher
among workers in the private than the public sector, among those in workplaces with no
union recognition and in smaller rather than larger workplaces.” It appears that eight
sectors (largely services) account for the bulk of the low paid workforce and no less than
two-fifths of them are located in retailing and hospitality alone.
1Abowd et al. (2012) also find that specific human capital, which is not always captured with observ-
able characteristics, has a strong effect on pay, especially in the US.
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Other factors may be important in explaining why certain industries pay more. For
example, the selection into jobs by workers facing wage discrimination may contribute
to low pay. Using Canadian data, Baker and Fortin (2001) conclude that women are not
low paid when they work in “female jobs”. The gender pay gap narrowed through the
1990s as women enter traditionally male occupations (Blau and Kahn, 2000). However,
recent studies suggest that non-cognitive skill differences may explain why a gap persists
today (Grove et al., 2011). Other studies suggest that workers with higher infra-marginal
tolerance for undesirable conditions are able to select into higher paying jobs (Gibbons
and Katz, 1992).
This paper offers an additional explanation, which has received little attention in
the literature. The analysis is motivated in part by the findings of Du Caju et al.
(2010) that employer, employee, and job characteristics together explain at most 40%
of wage premium across industries. The possibility that an excess (or shortage) in the
demand for labour could lead to higher (or lower) wages, conditional on worker and firm
characteristics, is considered in this paper. Existing evidence on this topic is limited. As
demand fell during health care restructuring in the US during the 1990s, Schumacher
(2001) found that the fall in both the absolute and relative wages of nurses was unrelated
to their personal characteristics. In their examination of the effects of structural change
within the US steel industry in the 1980s, Beeson et al. (2001) found that the decline
in employment was accompanied by a fall in mean wages and a rise in the variance of
wages, particularly for those on low wages and with poor education. The rise in wage
inequality was particularly evident for young males, and also spilled over to firms in the
supply chain.
The positive wage-effects of an increase in demand for labour documented in this
study are related to studies which show that positive wage-effects follow increases in
demand for college educated labour (Katz and Murphy, 1992). Murphy and Welch
(1993) and Juhn et al. (1993) link the increase in wages from 1940-1990 to increases
in the demand for skilled (highly educated) workers. More recent changes in the wage
structure are also linked to the demand for specific skill. Autor et al. (2003, 2008) find
that the polarisation of the US wage structure can be linked to a decrease in demand
for middle-skill jobs which are increasingly off-shored. In Germany, Dustmann et al.
(2009) find evidence of polarisation which can be linked to change in the type of skill
in demand by employers (Spitz−Oener, 2006). Similar findings exist for the UK (Goos
and Manning, 2007), and other European Countries (Goos et al., 2009). Whereas these
studies document nuanced changes in wage structure stemming from the demand for
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specific types of skill, this paper documents changes stemming from the macroeconomic
demand relevant to the particular industry.
3 Data
This paper uses data from two of the largest western economies: the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC), widely known as the “March CPS” of the US Current
Population Survey (CPS), and the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel). Since
labour markets differ substantially between Europe and North America, this approach
demonstrates the robustness of the results to particular institutional arrangements and
policies.
The US data is drawn from a monthly US household survey conducted jointly by
the US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labour Statistics, comprising basic labour
force and demographic questions on income, employment, poverty, health insurance and
taxation (King et al., 2010). The data spans sixteen years (t) from 1997-2013 sixteen
1990 industry codes (i) and 51 US states (l). Personal characteristics used in the analysis
include age, educational attainment, full-time/part-time employment status and gender.
Characteristics of the firms employing respondents are also used. These characteristics
include firm size and whether or not workers are unionised. To retain some homogeneity
in the sample self-employed workers and respondents younger than 15 are excluded.
Analysis is undertaken at the industry- region- level. Data for each variable are
averaged within each unique cell of industry, US State and year (ilt) to obtain the
appropriate level of aggregation in the data. This collapse of the data has the advantage
of removing individual heterogeneity by averaging within each i, l, t cell. Continuous
variables such as age or years of education are first grouped into discrete categories that
are more informative when collapsed. Education is represented by the share of employees
holding the a university degree or higher for each industry-region-year group, firm size
is captured by the shares of firms which have less than 10, 10-99 and more than 100
employees, and age is captured by groupings that represent the shares of workers less
than age 25, age 25-45 and aged above 45. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1,
panel A.
Data on job vacancy rates obtained from the Job Openings and Labour Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) are also used in the analysis. These data are available in monthly
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series at the national level for 16 industry codes for the years 2001-2013. Agriculture
is excluded. This paper uses the March vacancy rates, which correspond to the month
during which the ASEC survey is conducted.
Data from Germany come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) which
is a longitudinal survey covering sixteen Bundeslands, or federal regions, (l). The data
spans twenty-three years (t) since unification, from 1990-2012, and includes 63 industries
(i) encoded by NACE (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Union)2. The GSOEP has maintained a high response rate throughout this period and
is considered to be a remarkably stable panel. Variables are constructed to mirror the
analysis for the US and the data is collapsed to a similar level across the 63 industries
and 16 Bundeslands (federal regions). University education is defined as corresponding
to third-level education in the GSOEP dataset. Two firm size ratio dummy variables
differ slightly from the US data, representing firms with less than 20 employees, 20-199
employees, and the omitted category firms with 200 or more employees.
The job vacancy rate by industry for Germany is obtained from the publicly available
Eurostat Tables. This paper uses the annual vacancy rate from 2000-2012 for all sectors
including agriculture. The level of aggregation of industries is higher than that available
in the GSOEP data itself providing information on 13 industrial groupings over the
period3. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1, panel B.
4 Estimation Methodology
The objective of the paper is to investigate the determinants of the position of the earn-
ings of workers in particular regional industries within the earnings distribution. Thus,
the basic hypothesis to be tested views the average wage in the industry as a function of
both average personal characteristics of the employees in the industry (loosely supply-
2The data for new hires and terminations is only available for 1991-2012 (waves 8 through 29 in
GSOEP), since new hires are defined as individuals who are in employment in year t who were not in
employment in year t− 1 in the specific industry; conversely terminations are defined as individuals who
are not in employment in year t who were in employment in year t− 1 in that industry. Hence, data is
not used from 1990 (wave 7) except for its use in respect of calculating new hires and terminations.
3Vacancy data for Germany from 2000-2003 is marked as “preliminary” by Eurostat. Vacancy data
for the years 2000-2008 is available according to NACE v1.1 categories and for the years 2010-2012
according to the NACE v2 categories. Several industry groups in v2 are collapsed to merge with the
earlier coding structure by manually calculating the vacancy rate from job opening and vacancy counts
also provided by Eurostat. Data for 2009 are only available in a quarterly series so the average vacancy
rate across the four quarters is used. Not all industry groups report vacancy statistics in all years.
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type variables) and the average establishment variables and other industry determined
variables (demand-type variables). The important innovation of the paper is that in
addition to assessing the effects of the employees’ average human capital and the effects
of the structure of the industry on the position in the industry’s average earnings, it also
aims to assess the effects of the macroeconomic demand relevant to the industry on the
industry average pay.
In general, the literature has abstracted from investigating the effects of the macroe-
conomic demand relevant to the industry on the industry average pay. This reflects both
the difficulty of empirically approximating the level of demand relevant to the industry
and the lack of relevant information in the large scale surveys which are normally de-
signed to capture only human capital variables. This paper adopts a methodology that
provides the theoretical underpinnings for the level of macroeconomic demand relevant
to the industry.
This paper uses two proxies capturing the industry demand for labour in the tradition
of the search theory (Holt, 1969; Modigliani and Tarantelli, 1973; Holt, 1970; Fazzari
et al., 1998). The first proxy is the net flow of workers into jobs within a particular state
and industry. Because there is considerable detail in the industry measure (26 different
2-digit industry codes are available), this measure provides a substantial amount of
cross-sectional variation. Respondents in the ASEC data are linked year-to-year so that
new-hires and recent involuntary separations (redundancies) are observed. Because of a
change in the unique identifier in 2005, it is not possible to identify past labour market
status for this particular year. To analyse the net flow, the 2005 value for the number of
redundancies is imputed with linear interpolation. The second proxy is the job opening
rate, or job vacancy rate, obtained from JOLTS data. One potential advantage of this
measure is that, instead of varying across industries and states, this measure varies only
across industries. This may be favourable for capturing more precisely the aggregate
demand pertaining to particular industries.
Overall, the literature suggests that there should be expected to be a connection
between the industry wage level and the level of macroeconomic demand relevant to the
specific industry. A useful starting point in this regard is the wage curve (Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1995). The wage curve suggests a negative relationship between levels of
unemployment and wages rates, when these variables are expressed in regional terms.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) argue that the wage curve reflects the observation that
a worker who is employed in a region of high unemployment earns less than an identical
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individual who works in a region with low unemployment. Blanchflower and Oswald
(1995) show that there is a stable relationship linking regional unemployment and the
level of pay which is a downward-sloping convex curve. The wage curve should be
expected to also be relevant at the regional industry and occupation level. Thus, the
wage curve for industry i in region l at time t can be represented by equation (1).
Wilt = f1(Uilt) (1)
The unemployment rate, U , in turn is determined by labour market flows, namely
the number of hires, H, and redundancies (or fires), R, in relation to the total number
of workers in the labour force, N , as indicated in equation (2), at the regional industry
level, such that
Uilt = f2
(
(Hilt −Rilt)
Nilt
)
(2)
Hence, taking together equations (1) and (2) yields equation (3)
Wilt = f3
(
(Hilt −Rilt)
Nilt
)
(3)
This can then be used to provide an augmented form of the usual human capital
earnings function where regional industry earnings differences at time t, Wilt, are ex-
plained not only by human capital (person) characteristics, Pilt, and industry (or firm)
characteristics, Filt, but also, following equation (3), by demand effects, Dilt. In this
earnings function, the variable to be explained is the average earnings in the industry i
in region l at time t as a proportion of the industry average earnings at time t, as shown
in equation (4). The explanatory variables include a number of human capital charac-
teristics (age, gender, educational qualifications) defined as the average of the human
capital characteristic in industry i in region l at time t as a proportion of the overall
incidence of these human capital characteristics at time t, and demand type variables,
namely “industry structure” variables (level of unionisation and firm size) and the level
of macroeconomic demand relevant to the industry, similarly defined, as follows:
Wilt = α1 +P
′
iltα2 + F
′
iltα3 + α4Dilt + ilt (4)
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The identification strategy in this paper removes the individual heterogeneity among
workers and firms by averaging the data over region, time and two-digit industry, in
line with Abowd et al. (2012). This allows the identification of changes in average
wages of workers in industry groups with data that is cleansed of the differences in
human capital within regional industry groups. Cleansing the data in this way should
mitigate the complicating factors including self-selection into industries based on some
unobserved characteristics, such as individual “ability”. Because firm characteristics are
also absorbed into the regional industry averages, firm-specific factors such as efficiency
wage setting (Borjas and Ramey, 2000; Du Caju et al., 2010) have limited effects. Finally,
the inclusion of industry fixed effects may capture some additional sources of wage
variation at the industry level. These sources might include whether on not minimum
wages are a binding constraint in some industries compared to others, whether certain
industries have a higher share of occupations which pay more, industry-specific market
power (Abowd et al., 2012), and the exposure of certain industries to trade openness
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005a; Amiti and Davis, 2012)4.
The equation to be estimated is shown in equation (5). Separate estimations are
performed for the US and Germany. The regressions are weighted with the employment
counts in each regional industry cell so that the results are representative of the em-
ployment distribution in the micro data. However, because the data are collapsed to
the regional industry level, the error structure accounts for arbitrary correlation within
industry and region.5 All independent variables in the regression model, except for
the industry employment share, are expressed in terms of the difference between the
industry-region level and the annual average across all industry-regions. This accounts
for any potential time trends or changes in survey methodology. For a given characteris-
tic share at the regional-industry level x, the regression covariate is given by (xilt − x¯t).
w¯ilt/w¯t = β0 + β1(d¯ilt − d¯t)
+ β2(m¯ilt − m¯t) + β3(e¯ilt − e¯t) + (a¯ilt − a¯t)′β4
+ β5(p¯ilt − p¯t) + β6(u¯ilt − u¯t) + β7(c¯ilt − c¯t) + (s¯ilt − s¯t)′β8
+ β9(nilt/n¯t) + ilt
(5)
4(Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) found that human capital is specific to the occupation rather
than the industry.
5Some heteroskedasticity may be introduced in this procedure. This issue is considered of secondary
importance to the benefits of accounting for any potential group structure in the residuals within industry
and region (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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The dependent variable is the average earnings in industry i in region l (w¯ilt) ex-
pressed as a proportion of overall average earnings (w¯t). The measure of average earnings
used is based on “total wage income” of employees in USD for the US and the “gross
labour income” of employees in Euros for Germany. If the ratio w¯ilt/w¯t exceeds one, then
this denotes region-industries with greater than average earnings in year t. It is impor-
tant to notice in the above variable specification that since in the numerator the current
value is subtracted from the average value over the period for every point in time, this
specification is a specification similar but not identical to the fixed effect specification of
Mundlak (1978).
The first independent variable of interest captures macroeconomic demand in an
industry relative to the average across all industries. One element is macroeconomic
demand, following equation (3). This is shown in the first line of equation (5). This flow
measure is approximated within each industry-region, ilt, as the excess of the new em-
ployment hires ratio, h, over the employment termination ratio, r. The new employment
hires ratio, h, is defined as new hires recorded with job tenure of less than one year, as
a proportion of the total number of employees. The employment termination ratio, r, is
approximated as job terminations due to company closure, dismissal, mutual agreement,
or end of contract, as a proportion of the total number of employees. Equation 6 pro-
vides further detail for the construction of the macroeconomic demand variable, which
relies on the further difference of hires and redundancies:
(dilt − d¯t) = hilt − rilt
nilt
− h¯t − r¯t
n¯t
(6)
Variables capturing human capital characteristics and the supply of labour are in-
cluded in the econometric model. These are shown in the second line of equation (5).
These include the ratio of male to female employees, m, the ratio of university to non-
university educated employees, e, and the age ratios for three age bands; below 25 years
of age, 25 to 45 and 46 and above, a. Two age ratio dummy variables are included
capturing ages 15-24 and 25-44 respectively (i.e. the omitted category is workers aged
45 or over).
A number of variables are also entered in the regression that capture a number of
structural characteristics of the industry. These are shown in the third line of equation
(5). These characteristics may also reflect the level of macroeconomic demand faced
by an industry. The share of full-time permanent workers is captured by the variable
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p. The specification also controls for union coverage rates of the workers within an
industry6. Unfortunately this variable, u is only available in the GSOEP for selected
years 1990, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 20117. The variable c, available only
in the GSOEP, captures the share of workers on temporary contracts or permanent
contracts but working irregularly (for example seasonal work). Firm sizes within the
industry are captured with the vector s, which varies slightly according to the data
available. For the GSOEP, this vector includes the share of firms with <20 employees
and the share with 20 − 199 employees. For the ASEC, it includes the share of firms
with < 10 employees and the share with 10 − 100 employees. As long as there is a
positive amount of unemployment in the economy, the number of workers, n, may also
be considered a demand-side characteristic representing the employment share of a given
regional industry. Throughout, the employee shares sum to one:
∑
nilt/n¯t = 1.
5 The determination of industry earnings: OLS estimates
5.1 Estimates for the US
The regression results based on equation (5) are shown in Table 2 for the US. Re-
sults are shown with different combinations of regional dummy variables and one-digit
industry dummy variables that capture fundamental differences across sectors of the
economy. The discussion that follows focuses on the most conservative specification (4).
Year-specific effects, including labour market policy changes, are accounted for in this
specification because both the dependent and independent variables are expressed as
quantities relative to the annual average. Appendix Table 8 demonstrates the robust-
ness of the results to the exclusion of 2005, the year for which the redundancies measure
is interpolated.
Human capital factors are shown to affect industrial average wages. The coefficient
for the male-female ratio is positive and significant. A 1% increase in the proportion of
male workers in an industry relative to the national average would lead to an increase
in the ratio of industry to average earnings by 0.17. The traditional reasons explaining
the gender wage gap range from differences in human capital, occupational sorting and
6In the GSOEP survey individuals were asked whether they were trade union members, whereas in
the ASEC they are asked if they are members or otherwise covered by a union agreement.
7An appendix shows the results for both the US and Germany without the union coverage variable,
and for Germany with union coverage using imputed (linearly interpolated) values for the missing years.
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discrimination (see Gannon et al. (2005) for Europe and Blau and Kahn (2006) for
the US). Unsurprisingly, the higher the proportion of university educated workers in a
particular industry, the higher are the average earnings in that industry. A 1% increase
in the proportion of university-educated workers in a regional industry relative to the
national average would lead to an increase in the ratio of regional industry to average
earnings by 0.57. These results are consistent with a substantial and robust return
to human capital investment for US workers. Card (1999) surveys this literature and
suggests that causal estimates may be close to 10% per year of education. Industries
dominated by younger workers have significantly lower average earnings in comparison
to those with higher shares of workers aged forty-five or above. For example, an increase
in the proportion of workers under 25 in a regional industry and the national average
proportion by 1% would lead to a decrease in the ratio of industry to average earnings by
0.6. This estimate is consistent with the larger body of literature stemming from Mincer
(1974) demonstrating the importance of controlling for experience in the estimation of
earnings.
The characteristics of regional industries are also found to be related to earnings.
Regional industries with a higher share of full time workers pay on average higher earn-
ings. The coefficient can be interpreted as follows: A 1% increase in share of full-time
workers in a regional industry relative to the national average, would increase the ratio
of industry to average earnings by 0.83. These results are consistent with the theoretical
literature suggesting that part-time or temporary employees might receive less training
than their full-time counterparts or may choose to invest less in their own human capital
(Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974). Similar results have been found in past studies summarised
by Hirsch (2005). Industries with a high concentration of small and medium sized firms
also tend to have lower than average earnings compared to those characterised by larger
firms. For example, a 1% increase in the proportion of firms in a regional industry that
employs less than 10 workers, relative to the national average, would lead to a decrease
in the ratio of industry to average earnings by 0.29. This result is in line with the es-
tablished literature that larger firms pay higher wages, a literature which may be traced
back to Moore (1911) and has been frequently reconfirmed in numerous studies in many
different countries since. Indeed, in a recent survey by Oi and Idson (1999), the firm
size effect is found to be at least as important as the gender wage gap.
Macroeconomic demand is shown to have a strong positive effect on the average wages
of regional industries. Conditional on worker and firm characteristics, a 1% increase in
the net flow into employment in a given regional industry and the national average flow
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increases the ratio of regional industry to national average wages by 0.72. It should be
noted that this effect, which stems from labour flows, is in addition to the premium paid
to larger industries captured by β8. The size of the industry, as measured by the share of
the national labour force it employs, has significant effects on industry average earnings.
This reflects the baseline effect of the level of demand for labour facing the industry
over the long term. Regional industries characterised by high demand may attempt
to attract labour from across the industrial distribution by offering higher wages. For
example, a large manufacturing employer in one state that secures a contract which
significantly increases production may wish to provide incentives to labour to relocate
from neighbouring states. They may also attract workers employed in different fields
of work, in which case a wage premium may be necessary to compensate a worker that
leaves a job where they currently enjoy a return to their specific human capital.
The importance of macroeconomic demand is highlighted also by using the national
level industry-specific job vacancy rate as a proxy for aggregate demand. Table 3 presents
results from the US. An increase in the vacancy rate above the national average of 1
percentage point leads to an increase in the wage ratio of 0.68. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry level because this is the source of variation for the vacancy
rate. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.8 This measure provides
convincing evidence that aggregate demand factors across industries have significant and
important effects on relative wages.
5.2 Estimates for Germany
It is salutary that the main findings regarding the US hold for Europe’s largest economy
as well. Table 4 presents results for Germany corresponding to results for the US in
Table 2. The sign and significance of these results match those for the US entirely,
with the exception of the employment share, which is negative in the specifications with
Bundesland dummy variables.
8Because cluster-robust standard errors may not satisfy the asymptotic assumptions when the number
of clusters is small, a cluster-robust wild boostrap procedure is used to prove p-values that satisfy these
assumptions (Cameron et al., 2008). This procedure validates the initial results. P-values are presented
at the bottom of Table 3.
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5.3 Notable differences of the results between the US and Germany
The return to education appears to be higher for the US relative to Germany for some
specifications. However the coefficients are almost identical in the most stringent spec-
ification (4). A 1% rise in the proportion of university-educated workers in a regional
industry compared to the national average is associated with a 0.57 increase in the ra-
tio of regional industry to average earnings in both countries. Specifications without
region dummy variables are consistent with cross-country comparisons in the literature
(Trostel et al., 2002) which indicate that an additional year of schooling has on average
twice the effect on industry earnings in the US as it does in Germany. Similarly, the
industry earning premium for a full-time job is much higher in the US than Germany.
This is consistent with greater overall wage inequality in the US relative to Germany
(Acemoglu, 2003). This difference in industry earnings may also be affected by working
hours, which are typically higher in the US than Germany (Nickell, 1997)9. One covari-
ate not available in the US data is the share of temporary workers. This is found to
decrease average wages in Germany.
The effect of macroeconomic demand relevant to the industry is also significantly
higher in the US. This may reflect the differential importance of supply and demand
factors across countries. One explanation for this difference is that lower firing costs and
less centralised bargaining in the US allow for a greater degree of response by employers
to macroeconomic demand. Nevertheless, in both countries there remains a strong and
significant effect from the demand side variable in the labour market. This in itself is
an important result because it demonstrates that the importance of the macroeconomic
demand for labour in terms of earnings is not the result of any particular institutional
settings in Germany or the US.
Because union membership information is not available for several years in the
GSOEP, it is imputed in the main results for the missing years 1991-92, 1994-97, 1999-
2000, 2002, 2004-06, 2008-10 and 2012. Appendix, Table 9 presents results Germany
without the union imputation. As can be seen, the estimates are consistent with the
results reported above, indicating robustness with respect to this procedure.
The alternative proxy for demand, the industry-level job vacancy rate, is not found
to have a significant impact in Germany. Results using the limited vacancy rate data for
9This effect may be exacerbated by the frequency of industry earnings reported. The data report
each respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary income for the previous calendar year in the US, while
for Germany they report gross labour income in the current month.
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Germany from 2000-2012 are presented in Table 5. It is likely that both the sparse data
and the lesser effect of demand on wages in Germany contribute to the insignificance of
this measure.
5.4 The importance of demand
This section compares several specifications which might be used to explain wage differ-
entials across industries in order to establish the relative importance of worker charac-
teristics, firm characteristics, and demand factors. Table 4 compares nine specifications
using the US data. By comparing specification (1) to specifications (2) and (3), for ex-
ample, it is evident that both demand proxies improve the fit of the regression. The most
informative exercise is a comparison of the last three columns. Relative to specification
(7), without any demand proxy, specification (8) shows that the vacancy rate explains
an additional 4% of the variation in wages across regional industries. This is a significant
component of the wage in light of the richness of this specification. The net flow proxy is
also able to explain an additional 1.5% of the variation in wages, conditional on worker
and firm characteristics.
5.5 The determination of industry earnings: fixed-effects estimates
In this section a more rigid econometric methodology is undertaken that provides evi-
dence on the impact within regional industries. There is some scope for individuals to
select into particular industries or regions according to unobserved ability and according
to the wages they pay. A worker with skills that are transferrable across industries might
be expected to pursue work in an industry where average wages are higher. If there is a
systematic mechanism behind this selection, then the average wages of industry-regions
may be endogenous. Consider, for example, the possibility that higher ability secretaries
select into the education relative to those who select into the manufacturing sector ob-
serving the favourable working conditions and relative pay of jobs in educational insti-
tutions. Differences in the relative sizes of these industries across regions might affect
selection decisions in ways that are not accounted for by separate intercepts industry or
state.
A fixed-effects model, shown in equation (7), is estimated to account for industry-
region specific unobserved factors. This model shuts down all time-fixed variation across
states and regions with industry-region specific intercepts, µ.
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w¯ilt = P¯
′
iltδ1 + F¯
′
iltδ2 + δ3Dit + µil + τt + ilt (7)
Time dummies, τ , are also included to account for time trends at the aggregate level.
This specification identifies the effect of demand on average wages using only the within-
industry-region changes in labour demand over time. The benefit of this procedure is
that it may be more likely to identify δ3. Standard errors are clustered at the JOLTS
industry level and the estimation is weighted using the employment counts prior to
collapse for the year 2000. However, it is important to note that the above fixed-effects
estimation and the above clustering on industry level naturally purges a significant part
of the variation in levels of demand relevant to the industry that is persistent across
regions and states. This should be expected to significantly weaken any effects of this
demand on the industry wage.
The specification is also simplified to ease the interpretation of the estimated model
parameters. Earnings, w, are measured annually in thousands of US dollars and other
variables in the vectors P and F are simply the employment shares of each characteristic
in the industry-region cell.
Increased demand within a regional industry increases the average income of workers
in that industry. Estimates of equation 7 are presented in Table (7). In column (1),
it is shown that an increase of 1% in the national-level industry-specific vacancy rate
leads to an increase in average wages of $735 US per year. This estimate is economically
significant. At an average annual salary of $31,000, a $735 increase represents an increase
in income of about 2%. The estimate varies slightly in specifications (3) and (4) according
to the controls for person and firm covariates, but remains fairly stable and statistically
significant at the 5% level with standard errors clustered at the industry-level.
Coefficients on the other variables are also as expected in terms of size and sign. An
increase in the share of university educated workers by 1% increases average wages by
about $287. A single percentage point increase in the share of male workers is associated
with average wages that are about $135 higher per year. This is approximately the same
effect that is expected from a 1% increase in the share of full time workers.
Estimates using the alternative proxy, the net flow of workers, are also computed
for both the US and Germany. These results are statistically insignificant although
they have the expected signs. This, combined with the greater predictive power of the
vacancy proxy in Table (6), suggest that aggregate level vacancy rates by industry may
17
be a more powerful representation of the aggregate demand facing a particular industry
in the case of the US.
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Table 1: Variable description and summary statistics for cell-level data
Panel A: US Current Population Survey (CPS), 1997-2013
Variable Description Mean SD N
Income (w) Wage income (1000s $US per year) 33.243 17.718 14183
Vacancy Rate Industry-level job vacancy rate 2.507 1.006 10447
Net Flow Net flow(hires-fires)/employed 0.973 0.105 13238
New Hires Number of new hires 32.733 47.852 14309
Redundancies Number of fires/redundancies 1.886 7.123 14309
Male Share of workers that are male 0.540 0.248 14204
Education Share of workers with at least a Bachelor’s degree 0.250 0.211 14203
Age <25 Share of workers age <25 0.241 0.196 14200
Age 25-45 Share of workers age 25-45 0.489 0.200 14204
Full Time Share of workers with full-time permanent contracts 0.812 0.187 14091
Unionised Share of workers covered by a union 0.126 0.229 11479
Firm Size <10 Share of workers in firms with <10 employees 0.152 0.160 14183
Firm Size 10-99 Share of workers in firms with 10-99 employees 0.238 0.178 14183
Employment Number of employed persons (thousands) 27.847 15.336 14309
Panel B: German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) 1990-2012
Variable Description Mean SD N
Income (w) Gross labour income (1000s Euro per month) 2.194 1.342 15874
Vacancy Rate Industry-level job vacancy rate 3.526 2.909 5313
Net Flow (hires-fires)/employed 0.883 0.192 15883
New Hires Number of new hires 14.401 25.517 15883
Redundancies Number of fires/redundancies 1.544 3.101 15883
Education Share of workers with ”Higher Education” (ISECD 1997 codes) 0.203 0.262 15840
Age <25 Share of workers age <25 0.116 0.188 15883
Age 25-45 Share of workers age 25-45 0.512 0.299 15883
Male Share of workers that are male 0.606 0.322 15883
Full Time Share of workers with full-time permanent contracts 0.649 0.315 14628
Unionised Share of workers covered by a union 0.308 0.367 4200
Firm Size <20 Share of workers in firms with <20 employees 0.167 0.263 15701
Firm Size 20-199 Share of workers in firms with 20-199 employees 0.292 0.284 15701
Temp workers Share of workers in temporary or irregular contracts 0.192 0.258 14707
Employment Number of employed persons (thousands) 10.657 2.140 15883
All variables measured at the cell-level where cells are the unique combination of industry and region. CPS has 16 industries and 51
states. GSOEP has 63 industries and 16 Bundesland regions. Union coverage in GSOEP is only available in 1990/3/8, 2001/3/7/11.
German vacancy rates from Eurostat 2000-2012, US vacancy rates from JOLTS 2001-2013. Net flow not available in 2005 CPS as
some workers not linkable in the IPUMS sample. Hires also include some obvious job switchers (past occupation or industry changes
along with firm size). Redundancies include only involuntary job leavers. Income is not rescaled to match since earnings ratios are
used in the analysis.
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Table 2: Industry Wage Differentials in the US 1997-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt
Demand (D)
Net Flow 0.669*** 0.393*** 1.016*** 0.716***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034)
Person (P¯)
Share Male 0.319*** 0.226*** 0.212*** 0.170***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019)
Share University Ed. 0.735*** 0.559*** 0.779*** 0.556***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
Share Age < 25 -0.611*** -0.495*** -0.746*** -0.602***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Share Age 25-45 -0.033 0.006 -0.064** -0.034
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Firm (F¯)
Share Full-time 0.879*** 0.950*** 0.721*** 0.828***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Union Share -0.052*** -0.143*** 0.008 -0.086***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Firm Size <9 -0.243*** -0.338*** -0.219*** -0.294***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028)
Firm Size 10-99 -0.174*** -0.235*** -0.021 -0.134***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Employment Share 4.530*** -8.567*** 5.998*** -7.160***
(0.742) (1.063) (0.730) (1.107)
Constant 0.988*** 0.888*** 1.359*** 1.256***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.032) (0.036)
State Dummies NO YES NO YES
Industry Dummies (9) NO NO YES YES
N 10,984 10,984 10,984 10,984
R2 0.598 0.657 0.640 0.689
Source: March CPS. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of fires per state-industry imputed in 2005 with linear interpolation
since data linkage issues prevent consistent observation of lagged labor market status in this year. Net flow is the number of hires -
fires observed in the linked longitudinal sample.
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Table 3: Industry Wage Differentials in the US 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt
Demand (D)
Vacancy Rate 0.081** 0.056** 0.104*** 0.068***
(0.033) (0.022) (0.026) (0.016)
Person (P¯)
Share Male 0.535*** 0.347*** 0.069 0.076
(0.096) (0.106) (0.133) (0.135)
Share University Ed. 0.816*** 0.599*** 1.028*** 0.605***
(0.208) (0.188) (0.207) (0.197)
Share Age < 25 -0.515** -0.436* -0.928*** -0.705***
(0.240) (0.224) (0.122) (0.094)
Share Age 25-45 0.042 0.057 -0.009 0.007
(0.145) (0.136) (0.073) (0.066)
Firm (F¯)
Share Full-time 0.895*** 1.087*** 0.679*** 0.937***
(0.185) (0.155) (0.088) (0.107)
Union Share -0.193* -0.339*** -0.044 -0.225**
(0.103) (0.107) (0.088) (0.081)
Firm Size <9 -0.340*** -0.368*** -0.345*** -0.421***
(0.093) (0.124) (0.111) (0.128)
Firm Size 10-99 -0.135 -0.238 0.039 -0.180
(0.151) (0.159) (0.113) (0.111)
Employment Share 8.349 -3.537 10.291* -4.290
(4.949) (6.322) (5.840) (4.842)
Constant 0.963*** 0.875*** 0.874*** 0.757***
(0.030) (0.038) (0.075) (0.071)
State Dummies NO YES NO YES
Industry Dummies (9) NO NO YES YES
Wild Boot p-value 0.028 0.062 0.000 0.000
N 10,186 10,186 10,186 10,186
R2 0.683 0.765 0.724 0.789
Source: March CPS and March JOLTS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on 16 industries. Wild Boot are cluster-robust wild
bootstrap p-values using 1000 repetitions.
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Table 4: Industry Wage Differentials in Germany 1990-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt
Demand (D)
Net Flow 0.436*** 0.196*** 0.321*** 0.135***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027)
Person (P¯)
Share Male 0.528*** 0.396*** 0.652*** 0.517***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016)
Share University Ed. 0.506*** 0.664*** 0.409*** 0.571***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015)
Share Age <25 -0.480*** -0.315*** -0.440*** -0.312***
(0.032) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031)
Share Age 25-45 -0.039** -0.032* -0.085*** -0.081***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017)
Firm (F¯)
Share Full-time 0.103*** 0.264*** 0.055** 0.273***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
Union Share -0.253*** -0.185*** -0.330*** -0.214***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
Firm Size < 20 -0.367*** -0.242*** -0.114*** -0.092***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018)
Firm Size 20-199 -0.477*** -0.305*** -0.361*** -0.218***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
Share Temp -0.166*** -0.143*** -0.196*** -0.083***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025)
Employment Share 5.065*** -3.014*** 7.047*** -6.311***
(0.469) (0.494) (0.610) (0.723)
Constant 0.953*** 1.189*** 0.697** 0.894***
(0.004) (0.028) (0.296) (0.257)
Bundesland Dummies NO YES NO YES
Industry Dummies (13) NO NO YES YES
N 11,899 11,899 9,916 9,916
R2 0.392 0.552 0.391 0.549
Source: GSOEP. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Net flow is the number of hires − number of fires observed in the linked longitudinal sample. Union share imputed with linear
interpolation for missing years.
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Table 5: Industry Wage Differentials in Germany 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt
Demand (D)
Vacancy Rate -0.010* -0.009 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Person (P¯)
Share Male 0.492*** 0.355*** 0.577*** 0.491***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.104) (0.051)
Share University Ed. 0.685*** 0.777*** 0.616*** 0.699***
(0.043) (0.064) (0.065) (0.108)
Share Age <25 -0.316** -0.181 -0.326* -0.204
(0.142) (0.112) (0.160) (0.129)
Share Age 25-45 0.056 0.014 0.015 -0.035
(0.071) (0.068) (0.052) (0.047)
Firm (F¯)
Share Full-time 0.044 0.246*** -0.018 0.260***
(0.053) (0.046) (0.070) (0.059)
Union Share -0.285 -0.308* -0.276 -0.264*
(0.188) (0.168) (0.163) (0.142)
Firm Size <19 -0.358** -0.247** -0.174 -0.093
(0.148) (0.102) (0.180) (0.131)
Firm Size 20-199 -0.568*** -0.404*** -0.470*** -0.307***
(0.084) (0.064) (0.121) (0.079)
Share Temp -0.487*** -0.472*** -0.500*** -0.389***
(0.087) (0.108) (0.083) (0.098)
Employment Share 6.116*** -0.882 6.500*** -6.474
(1.161) (3.106) (1.423) (3.671)
Constant 0.970*** 1.063*** 0.639*** 0.742***
(0.011) (0.029) (0.123) (0.111)
Bundesland Dummies NO YES NO YES
Industry Dummies (13) NO NO YES YES
N 4,819 4,819 4,819 4,819
R2 0.441 0.547 0.468 0.572
Source: GSOEP. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Vacancy rate from Eurostat vacancy statistics. Union share imputed for missing years.
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6 Discussion and conclusions
This paper examined the effects of human capital, industry structure and macroeconomic
demand on industry earnings using two major data sets from the US and Germany. The
paper also evaluates two different proxies for aggregate demand across industries. The
first important result is that the level of aggregate demand in a regional industry relative
to the average across all regions and industries has a strong positive effect on average
earnings of that regional industry. The second key result is that the national-level
vacancy rate by industry holds more predictive power relative to proxies based on the
net flow of workers.
Interestingly this study finds that union membership appears to be more important
to industry average earnings in the US relative to Germany. Employee and firm charac-
teristics are also found to be important in ways similar to prior findings in the literature.
The share of employees with university education and industries with larger shares of
older and male workers also tend to have higher industry average earnings. Industries
characterised by smaller and medium sized firms tend to have lower average earnings,
as do those characterised larger proportions of part-time workers.
The results make a clear contribution to the literature, embracing and extending
previous knowledge about the determinants of industry average earnings. The results
also show that worker ability is not the whole story behind industry earnings differentials.
Macroeconomic factors and institutional characteristics play important and significant
role.
These results have clear policy impact. They reinforce the importance of education
in public policy aimed at reducing low-paid employment, but also advocate the pro-
motion of policies which provide incentives to firms to value workers with experience
and, arguably, dissuade disproportionate use of inferior contracts in preference for those
which are full-time. Importantly, the results also highlight the importance of demand-
side policies. The macroeconomic environment is important in addressing problems of
low pay. The results suggest that demand-reducing policies that typically characterise
austerity packages will have adverse effects in terms of achieving a productive, high-wage
economy.
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7 Appendix
Table 8: Industry Wage Differentials in the US 1997-2004 and 2006-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt
Demand (D)
Net Flow 0.690*** 0.415*** 1.096*** 0.797***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.037) (0.036)
Person (P¯)
Share Male 0.322*** 0.233*** 0.221*** 0.179***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020)
Share University Ed. 0.747*** 0.572*** 0.801*** 0.588***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021)
Share Age < 25 -0.619*** -0.501*** -0.746*** -0.607***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Share Age 25-45 -0.057* -0.015 -0.094*** -0.064**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Firm (F¯)
Share Full-time 0.870*** 0.932*** 0.706*** 0.800***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Union Share -0.039*** -0.126*** 0.020* -0.069***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Firm Size <9 -0.266*** -0.359*** -0.241*** -0.315***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029)
Firm Size 10-99 -0.184*** -0.245*** -0.043* -0.147***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Employment Share 4.110*** -8.914*** 5.234*** -7.858***
(0.755) (1.096) (0.740) (1.137)
Constant 0.993*** 0.903*** 1.045*** 0.974***
(0.003) (0.023) (0.013) (0.025)
State Dummies NO YES NO YES
Industry Dummies (9) NO NO YES YES
N 10,234 10,234 10,234 10,234
R2 0.596 0.651 0.640 0.685
Source: March CPS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Net flow is the number of hires−number of fires observed in the linked longitudinal sample.
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Table 9: Industry Wage Differentials in Germany 1990-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt wilt/wt
Demand (D)
Net Flow 0.573*** 0.272*** 0.418*** 0.180***
(0.047) (0.040) (0.049) (0.041)
Person (P¯)
Share Male 0.514*** 0.378*** 0.667*** 0.503***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.030) (0.025)
Share University Ed. 0.457*** 0.632*** 0.336*** 0.522***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025)
Share Age <25 -0.480*** -0.289*** -0.432*** -0.264***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.059) (0.049)
Share Age 25-45 -0.045 -0.031 -0.103*** -0.085***
(0.033) (0.027) (0.034) (0.028)
Firm (F¯)
Share Full-time 0.140*** 0.276*** 0.113*** 0.293***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.032)
Union Share -0.199*** -0.145*** -0.296*** -0.187***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029)
Firm Size < 20 -0.282*** -0.201*** -0.038 -0.080***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.034) (0.029)
Firm Size 20-199 -0.422*** -0.260*** -0.294*** -0.178***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026)
Share Temp -0.051 -0.076** -0.079* -0.022
(0.045) (0.038) (0.047) (0.039)
Employment Share 5.728*** -4.018*** 7.413*** -8.259***
(0.840) (0.849) (1.061) (1.188)
Constant 0.955*** 1.131*** 0.812*** 0.936***
(0.006) (0.045) (0.095) (0.091)
Bundesland Dummies NO YES NO YES
Industry Dummies (13) NO NO YES YES
N 4,000 4,000 3,337 3,337
R2 0.362 0.565 0.398 0.594
Source: GSOEP. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Net flow is the number of hires − number of fires observed in the linked longitudinal sample.
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